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Abstract
One of the significant challenges in the Internet of Things (IoT) is the provisioning of guaran-
teed security and privacy, considering the fact that IoT devices are resource-limited. Often-
times, in IoT applications, remote users need to obtain real-time data, with guaranteed
security and privacy, from resource-limited network nodes through the public Internet. For
this purpose, the users need to establish a secure link with the network nodes. Though the
IPv6 over low-power wireless personal area networks (6LoWPAN) adaptation layer stan-
dard offers IPv6 compatibility for resource-limited wireless networks, the fundamental
6LoWPAN structure ignores security and privacy characteristics. Thus, there is a pressing
need to design a resource-efficient authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme for ensuring
secure communication in 6LoWPAN-based resource-limited networks. This paper proposes
a resource-efficient secure remote user authentication scheme for 6LoWPAN-based IoT
networks, called SRUA-IoT. SRUA-IoT achieves the authentication of remote users and
enables the users and network entities to establish private session keys between them-
selves for indecipherable communication. To this end, SRUA-IoT uses a secure hash algo-
rithm, exclusive-OR operation, and symmetric encryption primitive. We prove through
informal security analysis that SRUA-IoT is secured against a variety of malicious attacks.
We also prove the security strength of SRUA-IoT through formal security analysis con-
ducted by employing the random oracle model. Additionally, we prove through Scyther-
based validation that SRUA-IoT is resilient against various attacks. Likewise, we demon-
strate that SRUA-IoT reduces the computational cost of the nodes and communication over-
heads of the network.
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1 Introduction
Low-power wireless personal area networks (LoWPANs) have found numerous applications
in the Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. LoWPAN devices are amenable with IEEE 802.15.4 and are
constricted in power, communication, data rate, and storage resources [2]. IEEE
802.15.4-enabled LoWPAN devices are deployed in various real-world applications, such as
home automation, healthcare systems, security surveillance, smart grids, and industrial motor-
ing. To provide Internet connectivity to a large number of devices deployed in a particular IoT
environment, the IPv6 protocol is considered the most accordant solution because of its larger
address space to render a unique IP address to each sensor node. By using IPv6 addressing,
sensor nodes can transmit sensed information to other devices or to a central location through
the public Internet.
To support large-scale connectivity for IoT, the Internet Engineering Task Force has
designed IPv6-over-LoWPAN (6LoWPAN) adaptation layer to render packet fragmentation,
reassembly, and encapsulation features for IEEE 802.15.4-based LoWPAN networks [3, 4].
Since LoWPAN devices collect information and send to a designated location via the public
Internet, it is imperative for LoWPAN applications to provide security and privacy. However,
the basic 6LoWPAN design does not provide security and privacy features to preclude an
unauthorized network entity from procuring the collected information and to prevent illegiti-
mate users from accessing the 6LoWPAN network resources [5–9].
6LoWPANs encounter the same security attacks as the traditional networks. These include
denial-of-service (DoS), replay, user/server impersonation (UI/SI), man-in-the-middle
(MITM), identity guessing (IG), user anonymity (UA), user/device impersonation (UI/DI),
stolen smart card/device (SSC/SSD), and ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks. However,
due to the resource-constricted nature of 6LoWPANs and the inadequacy of organized net-
work architectures, securing 6LoWPAN becomes more challenging [10]. Authentication,
availability, integrity, data freshness, and confidentiality are imperative security provisions in
6LoWPANs. Confidentiality guarantees secure data transmission between authorized users
and servers. Authentication and key establishment (AKE) is the mechanism to identify devices’
and users’ legitimacy in 6LoWPANs [11] and to set up a secret session key (SK) for encrypted
communication. Therefore, a lightweight AKE mechanism becomes imperative for securing
the network [12–20].
1.1 Related work
An overview of the existing AKE schemes for 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks and their limita-
tions is presented in S1 Table, which shows that no existing scheme can withstand all known
attacks. Pandi et al. [42] propounded an authentication scheme for vehicular ad-hoc networks
(VANETs) to enable the network entities to communicate securely. The scheme presented by
Pandi et al. is efficient in terms of certificate computation while preserving privacy of the enti-
ties. Pandi et al. [43] presented an AKE scheme for IoT-based wireless body area networks
(WBANs), which is computationally less expensive and ensures secure communication. Azees
et al. [44] propounded an anonymous authentication scheme for WBANs, which is capable of
resisting various covert security attacks while requiring fewer resources. Azees et al. [45] pre-
sented a blockchain based authentication scheme for VANETs, which is capable of resisting
different security attacks and renders secure communication in VANETs.
The authors in [34] propounded a multi-factor AKE scheme for the IoT environment. The
AKE scheme proffered in [34] uses a lightweight hash function along with advanced encryp-
tion standard (AES). However, the scheme is unable to restrain SSD, DoS, replay, and sensor
node (SN) capture attacks. A Chinese remainder theorem-based authentication scheme is
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presented in [23], which cannot resist replay attack and does not provide strong privacy. In
addition, a signature and certificate-based computationally efficient authentication scheme for
VANETs is presented in [46]. The authors in [47] propounded a resource-efficient AKE
scheme for the IoT environment by utilizing hash function and XOR operation. However, the
AKE scheme presented in [47] is prone to SSD, stolen verifier, UI, and UA attacks and is
unable to ensure SN’s anonymity. An AKE scheme is propounded in [48] for mobile networks.
The scheme proposed in [48] is resource-efficient and is suitable for mobile networks. A cosine
similarity-based AKE scheme for the IoT environment is proposed in [49]. Furthermore, to
enable security and privacy in different IoT-based networks, various AKE schemes are
reported in the exiting literature [19, 50–66].
Additionally, the security analysis of an eminent AKE scheme presented in [31] is given at
S1 Appendix. We have thoroughly analyzed the scheme and demonstrate that it is unsafe
against de-synchronization attack and does not provide a revocation phase (RP). In [31], gate-
way broadcasts the authentication message to all sensor nodes deployed in the network, and a
user does not specify the sensor node from which it is going to procure the information. Thus,
all the sensor nodes in the network process the received message, which causes an extra
computational overhead for every node.
1.2 Research contributions
This paper presents a resource-efficient secure remote user authentication scheme for 6LoW-
PAN-based IoT networks (SRUA-IoT). The proposed scheme performs user authorization
before procuring real-time data from sensors stationed in the 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks.
The scheme employs a lightweight secure hash algorithm (SHA-160) and advanced encryption
standard (AES-192) to accomplish the AKE process and makes the following contributions.
1. SRUA-IoT is an AES and hash function based remote user AKE scheme for 6LoWPAN-
based IoT networks, which renders user revocation and password change phases. Besides,
SRUA-IoT ensures the legitimacy of remote users (RUs) to access real-time information
from a sensor node while ensuring the privacy and anonymity of RUs. An RU indicates to
the gateway a particular sensor node for procuring real-time information, which reduces
the unnecessary computational overhead.
2. SK’s security in SRUA-IoT is corroborated using random oracle model (ROM). Informal
security validation illustrates that SRUA-IoT is protected against SSC, de-synchronization,
replay, and DoS attacks. In addition, Scyther tool analysis illustrates that the proposed
scheme is protected.
3. We demonstrate that SRUA-IoT renders enhanced security functionalities aside from its
low storage, computational, and communication costs, as compared to well-known AKE
schemes.
1.3 Paper organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The system model is presented in Section
2. The proposed SRUA-IoT scheme is elaborated in Section 3. Security analysis is presented in
Section 4. Performance evaluation of SRUA-IoT is detailed in Section 5. Finally, the paper is
concluded in Section 6.
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2 System model
The network model consists of a gateway GW, a registration center (RC), and remoter users
(RUy|y = 1, 2, 3, � � �, N). In the SH environment, sensor nodes (SNx|x = 1, 2, 3, � � �, n) are
deployed to monitor various processes. SNx collect critical information and forward to the
server stationed at RC. RC is responsible for the deployment of SNx and implementing various
access control policies in SH. Before procuring real-time information from SNx, it is necessary
for RUy to register with RC. After registration, RUy can access the network resources and the
allocated SNx. It is assumed that all network nodes are time synchronized.
The well-established Dolev Yao (DY) threat model [67] is employed, wherein an adversary
A can intercept communications between two network entities communicating via a public
channel. A can modify the intercepted messages or use the message for various malicious pur-
poses. A can procure the secret credentials stored in a sensor node’s memory. Furthermore, A
can obtain RUy’s smart device SDy and can extract secret credentials form SDy to execute vari-
ous security attacks.
RUy needs to communicate with SNx to securely procure the real-time information col-
lected by SNx. Therefore, an AKE scheme is imperative for secure and reliable communica-
tions between RUy and SNx. To achieve reliable and secure communication, the following
section presents an RUy AKE scheme, called SRUA-IoT.
3 The proposed SRUA-IoT scheme
SRUA-IoT seeks to ensure reliable and secure access to 6LoWPAN network resources. The
scheme first verifies the authenticity of RUy and then establishes a secret SK for encrypted
communication by employing a lightweight hash function and AES-192 during the AKE pro-
cess. SHA is an irreversible function, which means that it is impossible to derive the input
from the output of SHA-160. Moreover, SHA-160 is a collision resistance function, which
means that the output of SHA-160 can never be the same for different inputs. AES-192 is used
as the encryption and decryption scheme in SRUA-IoT. SRUA-IoT is composed of seven
phases, which are presented in the following subsections. S2 Table lists the notations used in
this paper.
3.1 Sensor node deployment phase
RC assigns various secret credentials to SNx before its deployment in the 6LoWPAN network.
Moreover, RC selects a GW’s secret Key (GK) of 512 bits and a unique identity IDG. Both GK
and IDG are known only to GW. RC executes the following steps to accomplish the sensor
node deployment (SND) phase.
3.1.1 Step SND-1. RC picks a unique IDSNx and PIDSNx each of size 80 bits. Moreover, RC
selects a random number Rx and computes a temporary secret (TS) for SNx as Ae = H(GK k








e are two chunks of Ae, each of size 80 bits.
3.1.2 Step SND-2. RC stores the credentials {IDSNx , PIDSNx , TSSNx } in the memory of SNx
before its deployment.
3.2 Remote user registration phase
It is imperative for RC to register RUy before providing access to the 6LoWPAN network
resources. RC assigns different secret credentials and a list of SNx to RUy. RC executes the fol-
lowing steps to perform the remote user registration (RUR) phase.
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3.2.1 Step RUR-1. RUy selects a distinct identity IDRUy and computes HIDy ¼ HðIDRUyÞ.
Moreover, RUy contrives a registration message MEr1 : fHIDyg and dispatches ME
r
1
to RC via a
protected channel.
3.2.2 Step RUR-2. RC selects a distinct pseudonym PIDx for RUy and calculates Aq = H
(GK k IDG), and Ax = H(HID k IDG k GK). RC determines a TS credential for RUy by dividing
Ax into two equal parts, namely, Aax and A
b





x. Moreover, RC computes the revocation parameter (ReP) as Bx = Aq�HIDy








x are two chunks of Bx. Besides, RC assigns a list of SNx
to be accessed by RUy. Furthermore, RC computes encryption key as EK = (Aq k [Aq]32), where
[Aq]32 are the first 32 bits of Aq (to make the size of EK 192 bits). In addition, RC derives
CTRUy ¼ EEKfTSRUy ; PIDSNx ;TSSNxg by using AES-192, and stores a list of credentials {PID
x,
RPRUy , CTRUy} in GW’s memory. Finally, RC fabricates a message ME
r
2




3.2.3 Step RUR-3. After procuring MEr
2
from RC, RUy supplies its IDRUy , password PSRUy
and BRUy at the interface of smart device SDy and computes ðbk;RpÞ ¼ GenðBRUyÞ by using
fuzzy extractor (FE). FE consist of two functions. The first one is Gen(.), which is a probabilis-
tic function that takes bio-metric information BRUy of RUy and produces two output parame-
ters, namely, secret bio-metric key βk and reproduction parameter Rp. The second function of
FE is Rep(.), which is a deterministic function that takes Rp and BRUy to reproduce βk. More-
over, SDy calculates Zx ¼ HðPIDx k TSRUy k PIDSNxÞ, Zy ¼ HðIDRUy k PSRUy k bkÞ, and encryp-
tion key EKy = (Zy k [Zy]32), where [Zy]32 are the first 32 bits of Zy to create EKy of size 192 bits.
Furthermore, SDy calculates CTlo ¼ EEKyfPID
x;TSRUy ;CTRUyg by using AES-192. In addition,
SDy computes authentication parameter as Authy ¼ HðIDRUy k PSRUy k bk k ZxÞ.
3.2.4 Step RUR-4. Finally, SDy stores the list of credentials {CTlo, Authy, Rp, Gen(.), Rep
(.), Et} in its memory and deletes all other parameters.
3.3 RU AKE phase
To access and communicate with the deployed 6LoWPAN based devices, it is necessary for
RUy to register itself with RC. RC allocates a list of secret credentials and devices to RUy at the
time of registration. After authorizing RUy’s legitimacy, RC allows RUy to access the specified
devices deployed in the network. After getting authenticated by RC, RUy and SNx set up an SK
for reliable and secure communication. The following steps elaborate RU AKE phase (RAP).
3.3.1 Step RAP-1. SDy receives the secret credentials PSRUy , IDRUy , and BRUy , and computes
bk ¼ RepðBRUy ;RpÞ and Zy ¼ HðIDRUy k PSRUy k bkÞ. In addition, SDy computes the decryption
key DKlo as DKlo = (Zy k [Zy]32), where [Zy]32 are the first 32 bits of Zy to make DKlo of size 192
bits. Moreover, SDy computes PTlo ¼ DDKlofCTlog, where CTlo is the ciphertext stored in SDy,
and retrieves PTlo ¼ fPIDx;TSRUy ; PIDSNxg. Furthermore, SDy calculates
Zlox ¼ HðPID
x k TSRUy k PIDSNxÞ, and authentication parameter
Authlo ¼ HðIDRUy k PSRUy k bk k ZxÞ. Finally, SDy checks Authy = Authlo to perform local
authentication. If the condition holds, SDy continues the AKE process.
3.3.2 Step RAP-2. After performing the local authentication, SDy chooses Tx of size 32
bits, and R1 of size 80 bits. SDy calculates G1 ¼ ðR1 k PIDSNxÞ � HðTSRUy k TxÞ and
Autha1 ¼ HðPIDx k PIDSNx k R1 k TSRUyÞ. Furthermore, SDy contrives a message MEa: {Tx,
PIDx, G1, Autha1} and dispatches it to GW via an open communication channel.
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3.3.3 Step RAP-3. Upon procuring MEa from SDy, GW verifies the validity of timestamp
by validating the condition TDx� |Tr − Tx|, where TDx is maximum tolerable packet time
delay, Tr is the receiving time of MEa, and Tx is fabrication time of MEa. If MEa receives at the
GW within the maximum allowed time delay limit, GW considers MEa to be a licit and fresh
message and continues the AKE phase. GW picks PIDx from the received MEa and looks up
PIDx in GW’s memory. If found, GW extracts the list of credentials {PIDx, RPRUy , CTRUy} related
to PIDx. In addition, GW calculates DK as M1 = H(GK k IDG) and DK = (M1 k [M1]32). More-
over, GW computes PT1 ¼ DDKfCTRUyg by using AES-192, and procures secret credentials
{TSRUy , (PIDSNx , TSSNx)} from PT1. Furthermore, GW obtains R1 and PIDSNx by computing
ðR1 k PIDSNxÞ ¼ G1 � HðTSRUy k TxÞ. To validate the authenticity of MEa, GW calculates
Autha2 ¼ HðPIDx k PIDSNx k R1 k TSRUyÞ and verifies the condition Autha1 = Autha2. If the
condition holds, GW continues the execution of the AKE process.
3.3.4 Step RAP-4. After validating the authenticity of MEa, GW picks a timestamp Ty and
random number R2, and computes W1 ¼ HðR1 k TSRUy k PID
xÞ, where W1 is obtained using
hash of the parameters, including R1, TSRUy , and PID
x. GW calculates the update parameter








are obtained by dividing W1 into two equal
chunks of 80 bits each. Besides, GW computes PIDx+1 = UP� PIDx and stores both PIDx and
PIDx+1 in its memory to avoid the de-synchronization attack. Moreover, GW calculates
W2 ¼ HðTSSNx k PIDSNx k TyÞ, G2 = W1�W2, G3 = (R2, R1)�W2, and
Autha3 ¼ HðW1 k R2 k R1 k TSSNx k PIDSNx k TyÞ. Finally, GW creates a message MEb: { Ty,
G2, G3, Autha3} and sends it to SNx via the public channel.
3.3.5 Step RAP-5. After procuring MEb from GW, SNx verifies the condition TDx� |Tr −
Ty|. If the condition holds, SNx computes W3 ¼ HðTSSNx k PIDSNx k TyÞ, W1 = G2�W3, and
(R2, R1) = G3�W3. Moreover, SNx calculates
Autha4 ¼ HðW1 k R2 k R1 k TSSNx k PIDSNx k TyÞ. Furthermore, SNx determines the integrity
of MEb by validating the condition Autha3 = Autha4. If the condition holds, SNx picks a time-
stamp Tz and a random number R2, and computes G4 = H(R1 k R2 k R3)�W1. For securing
communication with RUy, SNx calculates SKx ¼ HðHðR1 k R2 k R3Þ kW1 k Tz k PIDSNxÞ. In
addition, SNx computes Autha5 = H(H(R1 k R2 k R3) k R1 k Tz k SKx). Finally, SNx calculates a
message MEc: {Tz, G4, Autha5} and sends it to RUy via the public channel.
3.3.6 Step RAP-6. RUy considers the received MEc fresh if the condition TDz� |Tr − Tz|
holds. If MEc is valid, RUy calculates W4 ¼ HðR1 k TSRUy k PID
xÞ, and H(R1 k R2 k R3) = G4
W4. For encrypted communication with SNx, RUy computes
SKy ¼ HðHðR1 k R2 k R3Þ kW4 k Tz k PIDSNxÞ. Furthermore, RUy computes Autha6 = H(H
(R1 k R2 k R3) k R1 k Tz k SKy) and checks Autha5 = Autha6. If the equation holds, RUy consid-
ers MEc as a valid message. Finally, RUy computes UP ¼Wa4 �W
b
4
and updates PIDx by calcu-
lating PIDx+1 = PIDx� UP1. RUy keeps both PIDx+1 and PIDx in its memory to ensure
resistance against de-synchronization attack. The user AKE phase of SRUA-IoT is summarized
in S1 Fig.
3.4 Password change phase
In SRUA-IoT, an authorized user RUy can change its password and update bio-metric infor-
mation without involving RC. RUy needs to perform the following steps to execute the pass-
word change phase (PCP).
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3.4.1 Step PCP-1. RUy provides its secret credentials, namely, IDoRUy , PS
o
RUy
, and BoRUy as




















Þ. By using AES-192 decryption algo-





x;TSRUy ; PIDSNxg. Furthermore,
SDy computes Zox ¼ HðPID










fies if the condition Autholo¼Authlo holds. If it holds, SDy notifies RUy to enter a new password
PSnRUy and update bio-metric information B
n
RUy
. Otherwise, SDy halts the AKE process.
3.4.2 Step PCP-2. Upon procuring PSnRUy and B
n
RUy
from RUy, SDy determines a new bio-
metric key βn by computing ðbn;RpnÞ ¼ GenðBnRUyÞ. Moreover, SDy computes the encryption















Þ, where ½Zny �
32
are the first 32 bits




x;TSRUy ; PIDSNxg. In addition, SDy computes Z
n
x ¼ HðPID








xÞ. Finally, by utilizing AES-192 encryption algorithm, SDy








Authy, Rp, Gen(.), Rep(.), Et} in SDy’s memory, and deletes all other credentials in its memory.
S2 Fig summarizes PCP.
3.5 Revocation phase
If a legitimate RUy loses its SDy, RUy can obtain a new SDnewy from RC. To obtain SD
new
y , it is
necessary for RUy to remember its IDRUy . For proper RP, it is necessary to remove the previous
data from GW’s memory. Most AKE schemes do not delete the old data from the memory of
GW or server. RUy needs to perform the succeeding steps to procure a new SC.
3.5.1 Step RP-1. Upon getting IDRUy , SDy computes HIDy ¼ HðIDRUyÞ, constructs a mes-
sage MErov
1
: fHIDyg, and forwards MErov1 to RC. After getting ME
rov
1
from RUy, RC computes B
= H(GK k IDG)�HIDy, RPRUy ¼ B
a � Bb, and verifies if RPRUy exists in its memory. If found,




fregistration requestg to RUy.




and computes HIDnew ¼ HðIDnewRUyÞ. SDy constructs a message ME
rov
3
: fHIDnewy g and sends to
RC.
3.5.3 Step RP-3. RC picks a new pseudonym PIDxnew for RUy and computes
Anewq ¼ HðGK k IDGÞ. To issue a new SD
new
y to RUy, RC computes the same computation as






; PIDnewSNxg and sends ME
rov
4
to RUy via a reliable channel.
3.5.4 Step RP-4. After receiving MErov
4
from RC, SDy executes the same computation as
excuted in Step RUR-3 of Section 3.2 Finally, SDy stores a new list of parameters {CTnew,
Authnewy , Gen(.), Rep(.), Rp




, CTnewRUy} in GW’s memory. The revocation phase is summarized in S3 Fig.
3.6 New SN deployment phase
RC can deploy a new SN (NSN) by performing the following steps.
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3.6.1 Step NSN-1. RC picks a distinct IDnSNx and PID
n
SNx
for NSN SNnx . In addition, RC
picks Rnx and computes a new temporary secret TS
n
SNx
for SNnx by calculating
Ane ¼ HðGK k R
n
x k IDGÞ, and TS
n
SNx
¼ An  ae � A
n  b




e are two chunks of
Ane , each of size 80 bits.
3.6.2 Step NSN-2. Finally, RC stores the credentials {IDnSNx , PID
n
SNx
, TSnSNx} in SN
n
x ’s mem-
ory before its deployment.
4 Security analysis
In this section informal security analysis of SRUA-IoT is carried out to shows its resistance
against various security attacks. The security of SK is validated by utilizing the well-known
ROM. Scyther based security analysis is performed to validate SRUA-IoT’s resistance against
replay and MITM attacks.
4.1 Informal security analysis
This subsection illustrates that the proposed scheme is protected against various attacks,
namely, replay, MITM, UI, offline PG, PI, and impersonation attacks.
Proposition 1 SRUA-IoT is resistant to replay attack.
proof 4.1 There are three messages exchanged during the execution of the AKE phase,
namely, MEa: {Tx, PIDx, G1, Autha1}, MEb: {Ty, G2, G3, Autha3}, and MEc: {Tz, G4, Autha5}.
These messages are constructed by incorporating latest timestamps Tx, Ty, and Tz. The freshness
of each timestamp is verified by validating the conditions TDx� |Tr − Tx|, TDx� |Tr − Ty|, and
TDx� |Tr − Tz| for each message MEa, MEb, and MEc, respectively. If these conditions do not
hold, GW, SNx, and RUy will detect the replay attack and the receiving network entity will dis-
card the received message. Therefore, SRUA-IoT is resistant to replay attack.
Proposition 2 SRUA-IoT is protected against DoS attack.
proof 4.2 In SRUA-IoT, RUy uses its secret credentials to pass the local authentication, for
which SDy needs to calculate Authlo ¼ HðIDRUy k PSRUy k bk k ZxÞ and check the condition
Authy = Authlo. Local verification will be successful if the condition holds. After local verification,
SDy sends the AKE request to GW. Otherwise, SDy terminates the AKE process and prevents RUy
from sending a large number of AKE requests to GW. Hence, SRUA-IoT is protected against DoS
attack.
Proposition 3 SRUA-IoT ensures untraceability and anonymity of RUy.
proof 4.3 In SRUA-IoT, during the registration and the AKE phase, only pseudo identities
are used, which do not provide any information about IDRUy . For each new AKE session, RUy uti-
lizes the updated PIDx+1, and fresh random numbers R1, R2, and R3. During the AKE process, the
communicated messages are different for each session. Therefore, A cannot correlate the captured
message from two different AKE sessions. Thus, SRUA-IoT renders the anonymity and untrace-
ability of RUx and SNx.
Proposition 4 SRUA-IoT is protected against MITM attack.
proof 4.4 In SRUA-IoT, there are three messages exchanged, i.e., MEa, MEb, and MEc. Let A
captures the the message MEa: {Tx, PIDx, G1, Autha1}, which is transmitted by RUy, and tries to
update the message content by selecting a random number Ra
1
and timestamp Tax . For this, A
needs to compute Ga
1
and Authaa1 to pretend that ME
a
a is from a legitimate RUy. However, A can-
not compute valid G
1
and Autha1 without knowing the secret credentials, namely, TSRUy , and
PISSNx , which are known only to RUy. We can illustrate the same conditions for MEb, and MEc.
Hence, SRUA-IoT is protected against MITM attack.
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Proposition 5 SRUA-IoT is immune to offline PG and SSC attacks.
proof 4.5 In this case, A can execute various attacks by procuring sensitive information stored
on the stolen/lost smart card or device. Let A obtains lost/stolen SDy of RUy and, by using power
analysis attack, can procure the information, such as {CTlo, Authy, Rp, Gen(.), Rep(.), Et} stored
in the memory of SDy. From the obtained information, A cannot retrieve secret credentials,
which are used during the AKE process. Therefore, SRUA-IoT is protected against SSC attack.
To update the password of RUy, A picks a random identity, password and bio-metric informa-
tion to compute bak ¼ RepðB
a
RUy
;RpÞ, Zay ¼ HðID
a
RUy





ay k ½Zay �
32
Þ,






g, calculate Zax ¼
HðPIDx k TSaRUy k PID
a
SNx







xÞ, and check Auth
a
y¼Authlo.
However, without knowing the secret credentials of RUy, such as IDRUy , PSRUy , and BRUy , it is not
possible for A to perform valid commutation as mentioned above. Therefore, SRUA-IoT is
immune to offline PG attack.
Proposition 6 SRUA-IoT is secure against impersonation attack.
proof 4.6 SRUA-IoT considers the following three types of impersonation attacks.






selecting Tax , and R1. However, to send an AKE request to RC, A needs to known both the
secret credentials, i.e., TSRUy and PIDSNx , which are known only to RUy. Moreover, TSRUy and
PIDSNx are stored in SDy’s memory in the encrypted form. Therefore, SRUA-IoT is secure
against UI attack.
2. RC impersonation attack: In this case, A picks Ra
2








;Authaa3} to pretend that this messages is from a legitimate RC. However, to
generate MEab, A needs to know the secret parameters, such as TSSNx and PIDSNx , which are
stored in encrypted form. Therefore, without knowing these parameters, A cannot fabricate a
false massage to make SNx believe that the message is created by a legal RC. Hence, SRUA-IoT
is secure against RC impersonation attack.





;Authaa5g and send it
to RUy to make RUy believe that the message is from a legal SNx. However, to generate a valid
MEc, A needs to knowW1, R1, R2, R3, and TSSNx . Without the knowledge of these secret cre-
dentials, it is impractical for A to create a licit message MEc. Hence, SRUA-IoT is secure
against SNx impersonation attack.
Proposition 7 SRUA-IoT is resilient against SNx capture attack.
proof 4.7 In 6LoWPANs, SNx are deployed in unattended environment. A can capture an
SNx and can procure the sensitive information stored in the memory of SNx. Since all the
deployed SNx contain distinct secret information, therefore, by capturing an SNx A cannot
breach the security of the entire 6LoWPAN. Hence, SRUA-IoT is resilient against SNx capture
attack.
Proposition 8 SRUA-IoT is immune to de-synchronization attack.
proof 4.8 If the network entities are updating pseudonyms during the execution of the AKE
process, A can establish de-synchronization attack by dropping the captured message. In
SRUA-IoT, GW and RUy update PIDx to PIDx+1 to accomplish anonymous communication.
However, to avoid the de-synchronization attack, both GW and RUy keep PIDx and PIDx+1 in
their memory. If A halts the AKE process by dropping the authentication messages, RUy can use
old PIDx for the AKE process. Therefore, SRUA-IoT is immune to de-synchronization attack.
Proposition 9 SRUA-IoT is resistant to ESL attack.
PLOS ONE A secure remote user authentication scheme
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0258279 November 8, 2021 9 / 18
proof 4.9 Proof In SRUA-IoT, both RUy and SNx compute SK as
SKx;y ¼ HðHðR1 k R2 k R3Þ k HðR1 k TSRUy k PID
xÞ k Tz k PIDSNxÞ. It is obvious that the calcu-
lated SK is the concoction of ephemeral (short term) parameters R1, R2 and R3, and long term cre-
dential, TSRUy , PIDSNx , and PID
x. A needs to compromise both ephemeral and long term
credentials to reveal SK. Therefore, SRUA-IoT is resistant to ESL attack.
Proposition 10 SRUA-IoT ensures PFS.
proof 4.10 From the discussion in Proposition 9, it is clear that SK is the concatenation of
fresh ephemeral and long term secret credentials. If A compromises SK of the previous AKE pro-
cess but cannot compromise SK of the new AKE processes, then SRUA-IoT renders the PFS
feature.
Proposition 11 SRUA-IoT ensures secure MA.
proof 4.11 In SRUA-IoT, RUy achieves validation on RC after verifying the condition Autha1
= Autha2. For this condition to hold, the knowledge of credentials GK, IDG, and TSRUy is required.
To verify the condition at SNx Autha3 = Autha4, the knowledge of TSSNx and PIDSNx is necessary.
SNx achieves authentication on SDRUy by validating the condition Autha5 = Autha6. Therefore,
RUy, SNx, and GWmutually validate each other to achieve secure mutual authentication.
4.2 SK security validation using random oracle model
We employ ROM to corroborate SK’s security in SRUA-IoT. In ROM, A consociates with kth
instance of a participating entity ENk, which is involved in executing SRUA-IoT. It can be a
legitimate RUy, GW or SNx. Therefore, ENkRUy , EN
k










RUy, GW, and SNx, respectively. To simulate real attacks, ROM considers various queries,
namely, Send, Test, Reveal, CorruptSD, and Execute. A description of these queries is presented
in S3 Table. Furthermore, SHA is modeled as a random oracle HR (|HR| specifies the rage
space of SHA output) and it is available for all SRUA-IoT executing entities including A. By
using the queries presented in S3 Table, the security of SK is proved in Theorem 4.12.
Theorem 4.12 Suppose a polynomial-time A is running against the proposed SRUA-IoT in
time Ti. If QRh denotes the hash quires, |HR| specifies the range space of SHA output, SQs indi-
cates the send queries, lbk defines the length of βk key, and |PD| refers to the password dictionary,
the approximated advantage of A in breaching the security of SRUA-IoT for procuring SK
between RUy and SNx can be defined as







proof 4.13 To prove this theorem, we consider the following four games (GMx|x = 0, 1, 2, 3).
4.2.1 GM0. A real security attack is accomplished by A against SRUA-IoT in GM0. A picks
c bits at GM0. Therefore, we can procure
ADASRUA  IoTðTiÞ ¼ j2:AD
A;GM0
SRUA  IoT   1j: ð2Þ
4.2.2 GM1. In GM1, A effectuates an eavesdropping attack and captures all the exchanged
messages MEa:{Tx, PIDx, G1, Autha1}, MEb:{Ty, G2, G3, Autha3}, andMEc:{Tz, G4, Autha5} during
the AKE process of SRUA-IoT by utilizing the execute query defined in S3 Table. To procure SK,
A executes the Reveal and Test queries and checks if the return key is a random string or real key
at the completion of GM1. The constructed SK between RUy and SNx is
SKx;y ¼ HðHðR1 k R2 k R3Þ k HðR1 k TSRUy k PID
xÞ k Tz k PIDSNxÞ. A needs to know all the
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long-term secrets and other ephemeral numbers, which are known only to RUy, SNx, and RC.
Hence by executing the eavesdropping attack, the chance of A to win the game will not be
enhanced. Therefore, it is evident that
ADA;GM1SRUA  IoT ¼ AD
A;GM0
SRUA  IoT: ð3Þ
4.2.3 GM2. In GM2, A performs an active attack by simulating Send and Hash quires. All
the exchanged messages MEa, MEb, and MEc are protected using the collision resistance SHA
function. The communicated message incorporates random number, timestamps, secret identi-
ties, and TSs. Therefore, no SHA collision will occur when A effectuates the Send and Hash quar-
ries. By birthday paradox, the following can be achieved.
jADA;GM1SRUA  IoT   AD
A;GM2
SRUA  IoTj � QR2h=ð2jHRjÞ: ð4Þ
4.2.4 GM3. This game effectuates the simulation of CorruptSD query. Typically, RUy picks
low-entropy passwords. By utilizing the password dictionary attack, A tries to guess the password
of RUy after procuring the information stored on SDy, including {CTlo, Authy, Rp, Gen(.), Rep(.),
Et}. A also attempts to guess βk from the information stored on SDy. SRUA-IoT employs robust
FE that generates highly random βk 2 [0, 1]lbk, where lbk is the length of βk. The probability of
guessing βk is nearly 12lbk. Furthermore, in the communication system, only a limited number of
wrong password attempts are allowed. Under these conditions, we have






After executing the above queries, A needs to guess bit c upon executing the Test query. There-
fore, we have ADA;GM3SRUA  IoT ¼ 12.
By utilizing the triangular inequality and simplifying (2)–(5), the following is achieved:
1
2






¼ jADA;GM1SRUA  IoT   AD
A;GM3
SRUA  IoTj
� jADA;GM1SRUA  IoT   AD
A;GM2
SRUA  IoTj




















We employ the well-known formal security validation tool, called Scyther [68], to validate the
security properties and correctness of the proposed SRUA-IoT scheme. To that end, the
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security protocol description language (SPDL) is utilized to specify SRUA-IoT by employing
the operational semantics ascertained in [68]. S4 Fig demonstrates that proclaims are satisfied,
which are specified in the SPDL script. In S4 Fig, SRUA-IoT is the name of the devised proto-
col with the initiator RU and RC as the helper node and SN as the responder. The descriptions
of Nisynch and secrecy are provided in [68]. Secrecy signifies that specific information is not
disclosed to any attacker, even when the information is exchanged over a public network. Fur-
thermore, Nisynch describes that any claim defined in the devised protocol specification will
also appear in the trace. Moreover, SRUA-IoT analysis illustrates that the supplementary secu-
rity characteristics produced by Scyther, namely, weak agreement (Weakagree), aliveness
(Alive), and non-injective agreement (Niagree) are validated.
5 Performance evaluation
In this section, the performance of SRUA-IoT is compared with Park et al. [69], Shuai et al.
[36], Das et al. [30], Shin et al. [31], Challa et al. [22], Srinivas et al. [33], Wazid et al. [35], and
Chen et al. [27] in terms of computational cost, communication cost, security features, and
storage cost. We use C/C++ based cryptographic library MIRACL and Raspberry PI-3 (RPI-
3B) with Quad-core @1.2 GHz, 1BG of RAM, and Ubuntu 16.04 LTS for implementing the
proposed SRUA-IoT and the relevant AKE schemes.
5.1 Security features
The proposed SRUA-IoT is compared with the relevant AKE scheme in terms of security func-
tionalities and resistance against various attacks. S4 Table exhibits that Park et al. [69] is
unprotected against UA, SSC, and PT attacks, Shuai et al. [36] is unsafe against de-synchroni-
zation attacks, Das et al. [30] cannot withstand SSC, PI, and UA attacks and does not ensure
SK security, Shin et al. [31] is insecure against de-synchronization attack and does not provide
revocation phase, Challa et al. [22] cannot withstand PI, SSC, UA, PG, and UI attacks, Srinivas
et al. [33] fails to protect against UI, PI, and SSC attacks, Wazid et al. [35] is unsafe against UI,
PI, and SSC attacks, and Chen et al. [27] cannot protect PI, PG, UA, UI, replay and DoS attacks
and also does not ensure mutual authentication. Contrarily, SRUA-IoT is secure as compared
to the relevant eminent AKE schemes, as shown in S4 Table.
5.2 Computational cost
In this subsection, the approximated computational overhead of SRUA-IoT and relevant AKE
schemes is determined by using computational time of various cryptographic primitives pre-
sented in S5 Table. SRUA-IoT has a computational cost of 19TSA + 2TED + Tbk � 6:901 ms,
which is less than the benchmark schemes, as shown in S5 Fig and S6 Table. SRUA-IoT has
53.09%, 23.88%, 44.23%, 29.56%, 22.04%, 76.41%, 24.07%, and 38.93% less computational cost
as compared to Park et al. [69], Shuai et al. [36], Das et al. [30], Shin et al. [31], Srinivas et al.
[33], Challa et al. [22], Wazid et al. [35], and Chen et al. [27], respectively. Furthermore,
SRUA-IoT has a computational overhead of 5TSA� 1.275ms at SNx, which is less than the
benchmark AKE schemes, as shown in S6 Fig and S6 Table. The computational overhead at
GW increases with the number of users accessing the network resources. S7 Fig shows that
SRUA-IoT requires low computational overhead while processing multiple AKE requests
simultaneously.
Although the security of SRUA-IoT is verified through formal and informal analyses in Sec-
tion 4 where the scheme has been shown to resist various covert security attacks, however, an
attack or some unexpected event can halt the execution of SRUA-IoT, which may occur at any
PLOS ONE A secure remote user authentication scheme
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0258279 November 8, 2021 12 / 18




ð1   attack success probabilityÞ
; ð8Þ
where Ti denotes time required to accomplish the AKE phase and
P100
i Ti denotes the average
time, which is procured after running SRUA-IoT 100 times, and Tatp denotes the execution
time required to complete the AKE phase under successful attack probability. S8 Fig demon-
strates the time utilization of SRUA-IoT and other related schemes with attack success proba-
bility. Under various successful attack attempts, SRUA-IoT requires less time to complete its
execution than the related AKE schemes.
5.3 Communication cost
The comparative analysis of communication cost is illustrated in this subsection. For
SRUA-IoT, the size of timestamp is 32 bits, ECC point is 160 bits, SHA output size is 160 bits,
random number size is 80 bits, different PID size is 80 bits, and AES key size is 192 bits. During
the execution of the AKE phase, SRUA-IoT exchanges three message, namely, MEa: {Tx, PIDx,
G1, Autha1}, MEb: {Ty, G2, G3, Autha3 and MEc: {Tz, G4, Autha5}, of length {32 + 80 + 160
+ 160} = 432 bits, {32 + 160 + 160 + 160} = 512 bits, and {32 + 160 + 160} = 412 bits, respec-
tively. The aggregated communication overheads of SRUA-IoT is 1356 bits. S7 Table and S9
Fig demonstrate the comparison of SRUA-IoT and other related AKE schemes. SRUA-IoT has
75.92%, 21.53%, 11.72%, 29.28%, 46.36%, 11.72%, 20.05%, and 57.2% less communication cost
as compared to Park et al. [69], Shuai et al. [36], Das et al. [30], Shin et al. [31], Challa et al.
[22], Srinivas et al. [33], and Chen et al. [27], respectively.
5.4 Storage cost
This subsection provides the storage cost comparison of SRUA-IoT with other AKE schemes.
In SRUA-IoT, RUy, GW, and SNx store {CTlo, Authy, Rp, Gen(.), Rep(.), Et}, {PIDx+1, PIDx,
RPRUy , CTRUy}, and {PIDSNx , TSSNx } of length {240 + 160 + 160 + 8} = 568 bits, {80 + 80 + 80
+ 240} = 480 bits, and {80 + 80} = 160 bits, respectively. The total storage overhead can be cal-
culated as {568 + 480 + 160} = 1208 bits. Besides, the storage costs of Park et al. [69], Shuai
et al. [36], Das et al. [30], Shin et al. [31], Challa et al. [22], Srinivas et al. [33], Wazid et al.
[35], and Chen et al. [27] are 1600 bits, 1776 bits, 3738 bits, 1160 bits, 4016 bits, 2888 bits, 4126
bits, and 1792 bits, respectively. SRUA-IoT has a slightly higher storage cost as compared to
Shin et al. [31]. However, SRUA-IoT has less computational and communication cost during
the AKE phase in contrast to Shin et al. [31]. S10 Fig illustrates the storage cost comparison of
SRUA-IoT and the related AKE schemes.
6 Conclusion
Information security is critical in resource-constricted 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks. This
paper has presented an AKE scheme called SRUA-IoT for resource-constricted 6LoWPAN
devices to validate the legitimacy of remote users interacting in real-time with sensor nodes
deployed in smart home networks. The scheme performs user authorization before procuring
real-time data from sensors by employing a lightweight secure hash algorithm (SHA-160) and
an advanced encryption standard (AES-192) to accomplish the AKE process. The proposed
scheme is corroborated both formally and informally to explicate its resistance against various
malicious security vulnerabilities. Moreover, numerical results in comparison with bench-
marks reveal that SRUA-IoT requires low computational and communication resources in
PLOS ONE A secure remote user authentication scheme
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0258279 November 8, 2021 13 / 18
6LoWPANs to accomplish the AKE phase. Our future work will explore authenticated encryp-
tion with associated data to devise a resource-efficient AKE scheme with reduced computa-
tional cost for resource-constricted IoT devices.
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